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mobility, node joining and leaving the network, iii)
limited resource constraints[2] such as processing
power, storage , battery power of the nodes, iv) lack
of centralized management. In contrast to the wired
network , each node in Ad Hoc network acts as a
host as well as a router that forwards the incoming
data packet to its neighbor node towards the
destination. Routing protocols play an imperative
role in creation and maintenance of virtual set of
connections between the nodes that need to deliver
data bits. Many different routing protocols have
been devised for Ad Hoc networks and have been
mainly classified into two categories such as
proactive (periodic) and reactive (on demand). In a
proactive routing protocol, nodes periodically
exchange routing information with other nodes in
order to have current routes to all destination [3]. In
a reactive protocol the route to the destination is
obtained as and when a node has data bits to send to
that destination [4].

Abstract: Security is a major threat and essential requirement
for mobile Ad Hoc network. Due to its inherent characteristics,
it has many consequent challenges, which needs to be taken
care of. In this paper we analyse the black hole attack in
MANET using AODV as its routing protocol. Black hole is a
type of routing attack where a malicious node impersonates a
destination node by sending deceived route reply packet to a
source node that initiates a route discovery process. By doing
this, the malicious node can deprive the traffic from the source
node. We propose a solution that makes a modification in
existing AODV routing protocol.

Keywords: Ad hoc Networks, Routing Protocols, AODV, Black
Hole Attack

1. Introduction
Needless to say a mobile ad-hoc network ( MANET
) is an autonomous system of mobile nodes
connected by wireless links. Two nodes can
communicate with each other when they are within
the transmission range but need cooperation of
intermediate nodes by forwarding packets when
they are multi hop away from each other. Although
mobile Ad-Hoc networks have many advantages
over wired network, it also suffers from many non
trivial challenges to the security design as they are
vulnerable than wired networks[1]. The complexity
of security issues arises due to the factors such as i)
open network architecture, ii) highly dynamic
network topology caused by node

Security in network layer plays an
important role in the security of the entire network.
The wireless channel is accessible to both legitimate
network users as well as to malicious attackers.
There are different types of attacks by malicious
node that can have a network and make it unreliable
for communications. These attacks can be classified
as active and passive attacks [5]. A passive attack is
one in which the information is snooped by an
intruder and does not disrupt the network operation
on the other hand an active attack disrupts the
normal operation of the network. Attacks can be
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further classified as external and internal attacks.
External attacks are carried out by nodes that do not
form the part of network, while compromised nodes
that were once legitimate part of the network are
cause of internal attacks

When one node needs to send a message to
another node that is not its neighbor, it broadcast a
RREQ containing several key bits of information:
The source, the destination, the lifespan of the
message and a sequence number which serves as a
unique ID. Each neighboring node responds to the
RREQ message by sending a RREP message back
to the source node if it knows a route to the
destination or the neighbor itself is the destination
node otherwise it rebroadcast the RREQ to its own
set of neighbors after increasing the hop count field.
If a source node does not receive the RREP in a set
amount of time, it rebroadcast a new RREQ with
new ID and longer lifespan. If a node cannot
respond by RREP, it keeps track of the routing
information in order to implement the reverse path
setup or forward path setup [6]

A black hole attack is a type of routing
attack in which malicious node advertise itself as
having shortest path to destination in a network by
sending fake route reply to the source node. It can
be used as Denial of Service (DoS) by dropping the
received packets. The malicious node can deprive
the traffic from the source node.
The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
background of AODV. Section 3 presents black hole
attack. Related work on prevention of black hole
attack is discussed in section 4. Proposed solution to
the black hole attack are presented in section 5 ,
Section 6 of this paper discusses the simulation
environment used and results for our proposed
solution Last section presents the conclusion.

The destination sequence number serves as
time stamp and allow intermediate nodes to
compare how “fresh” their information on other
nodes. Every time node sends out message increases
its own sequence number. A higher sequence
number signifies a fresher route. If a node receives
more than one RREPs, it updates its routing
information and propagates the RREP only if RREP
contains either a greater destination sequence
number than in the previous RREP or same
destination sequence number with a smaller hop
count and discards all other RREPs it receives. The
source node starts the data transmission as soon as it
receives the first RREP, and then updates the
routing information later for better route to the
destination. Nodes stores or updates following
information in their route table:

2. The Routing Protocol : AODV
The Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector
(AODV) is a state of the art reactive routing
protocol suitable for dynamic link condition and is
an adaptation from DSDV protocol. Every node in a
Ad Hoc network maintains a routing table and
whenever a source node needs to communicate with
another node, it sets up a route on-demand at the
start of the communication session for which it has
no routing information and makes use of the route
till it breaks. Route discovery process being the part
of AODV uses control messages such as Route
Request (RREQ), Route Reply (RREP). AODV is
also able to handle changes in route if there is an
error through the control message Rout Error
(RERR). Nodes that communicate directly with
another is considered to be its neighbor and a node
keeps track of its neighbors by listening to a
HELLO message that each node broadcast at regular
intervals.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Destination node address
Source node address
Hops up to destination
Next hop to destination node
Destination sequence number
Active neighbors for the route
Route expiration time

The routing protocol typically assumes that all
nodes are cooperative in the communication process
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and at the same time malicious attackers can disrupt
the network operation. In this paper, we discuss the
black hole attack in particular and propose a
solution to it.

Figure 3.1
In figure 3.1, S and D are assumed to be source and
destination nodes respectively. Let M be the
malicious node. S being the source node would
initiate the route discovery process and broadcasts a
RREQ that is received by the nodes B, M and E
being the neighbors of node S. Upon receiving the
RREQ from the node S, node B and E makes a
search to their cache for a fresh route to the
destination. Non-availability or older entry in their
route table causes nodes to rebroadcast the RREQ
and this process is continued till the RREQ arrives
at node D. But node M claims to have the fresh
route to destination and sends RREP packet to the
source node S. The reply from the malicious node
reaches the source node much earlier than other
legitimate nodes, as the malicious nodes does not
have to check its routing table. Nodes those have
route to the destination would update their route
table with the accumulated hop count and the
destination sequence number of the destination node
and generate a RREP control message. The
destination sequence number that determines the
freshness of a route is a 32-bit integer associated
with every route [8]. The malicious node claims to
have a fresher route by including a very high
destination sequence number in RREP packet. The
source node chooses the path provided by the
malicious node and starts sending the data packets,
which are dropped by the malicious node.

3. Black hole attack
MANETs are vulnerable to various attacks due to
the factors described in the introduction section of
this literature. These attacks directly pose threat to
the important network layers such as physical, data
link and network layer which are responsible for
routing mechanism of the network, Attacks in
network layer can either cause Denial of Service
(DoS) by not forwarding the packet or add and
modify the routing parameters such as hop count
and sequence number in control messages, When
the malicious node is chosen as route to the
destination, it stops forwarding the data packets.
In black hole attack, the malicious node waits for its
neighbor to send a RREQ packet. Upon receiving
the RREQ packet, the malicious node immediately
sends a forged RREP to the source node with a
modified higher sequence number. In such a case,
the source node assumes that the node is having a
fresh route towards destination. The source node
discards the RREP packets it receives from other
nodes having genuine route and send data packets
through malicious node. A malicious node takes all
routes towards itself and does not allow forwarding
any packet. This attack is called black hole as it
swallows (drops) all objects; data packets [7].

4. Related work
Several researchers have studied the vulnerabilities
of MANETs and black hole attack in particular.
Black hole attack is one of the active DoS. Many
researchers have proposed their solutions which are
available in literature.

B
C
S
M
D

The solution proposed in[9] require that the
requesting node should wait for a predetermined set
E
time to receive RREPs with next hop details instead
of from other neighboring node sending data
packets immediately after receiving a reply. After
Link
RREQ
RREP
the time out, it first checks in CRRT table whether
there is any repeated next hop node. If any next hop
International Journal of Computer and Communication Technology (IJCCT), ISSN: 2231-0371, Vol-3, Iss-4
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From the learning data set , the distance
with the maximum value is considered as Threshold
Th.

node is present in the reply path it assumes the path
is correct or the chance of malicious path is limited
.Extra overhead is added in the process of finding
repeated next hop and adds a delay.
In[10] author has suggested anomaly based
detection technique through dynamic learning
method .IN this approach , the normal state of the
network view is updated periodically to adopt to the
frequent network changes and “clustering-based ”
technique is adopted to identify the nodes that
deviate from the normal state.

Th =d(x1), where I=argi max d(xi) xi €D

As per this approach the characteristics
considered to express the normal state of network
are (i) total number of RREQs sent out .(ii) total
number of RREPs received

When the distance for any input data
sample is larger than the Th, it is considered as
deviding from the normal traffic and hence judged
as attack else
.
By using data collected
in initial time ΔT0 , the calculated mean vector is
used to detect next period time interval i.e ΔT .If ΔT
is considered as normal , the corresponding data set
else it is treated as data with attack and
consequently discarded.

(iii) average of destination sequence number
difference between the RREP sequence number and
the one held in the list in each time slot .The
network state in time slot ; is expressed by three –
dimensional vector xi=(xi1,xi2,xi3).

[The solution proposed by the author suffer
from the network resource limitation such as battery
power, storage and processing. Every time interval
ΔT, the input data set need to be collected &
processed resulting additional overhead]

The mean vector values of these features
are calculated as in (1) where D is training data set
for N time slots.

In [11], source node verifies the
authenticity of node that inititate RREPs by finding
more than one route to the destination. when source
node receives RREPs , if routes to destination
shared hops , source node can recognize the safe
route to destination.

N
x¯D=1/N Σ xi
(1)

In [12], the author has developed a
neighborhood approach capable of detecting the
black hole attack. Once the root discovery process
initiated by the source is over, the source node
sends a special control packet to request the
destination to send its current neighbor set. If the
two neighbor sets received at the same time are
different enough, it can be considered that they are
generated by two different nodes. The claim for the
same is substantiated with the following
observation.

i=1
Hence the initial training data refer to the data
collected in first interval of the network i.eΔT0.
The distance of each input data sample x to
the mean vector for each time slot is calculated as
shown in (2)
d(x)=||x- x¯D||2
(2)

(i)
Considering the node mobility and size of
the network, the neighbor set difference of one node
at different time instants t and t+1.The results shows
no much change in neighbor sets during route
discovery.
International Journal of Computer and Communication Technology (IJCCT), ISSN: 2231-0371, Vol-3, Iss-4
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(ii)
The neighbor set difference of two
different nodes at the same time ,that is

to prevent black hole attack. The algorithm is given
in following fig.

({A’s neighbor set}U {B’s neighbor set })-({A’s
neighbor set}∩{B’s neighbor set }) has the
probability that node A’s neighbor set is the same as
that of node B is very small.
So when the source node receives the neighbor set ,
it and analysis them by measuring the difference
with a predefined threshold values . If the difference
is larger , the source node concludes that the current
network has black hole attack and responds to it
accordingly.

1

Pre_Process_RREP(){

2

t=CURRENT_TIME+WAIT_TIME;

3

while (CURRENT_TIME < t){

4

packet Old_pkt=Cur_Pkt=Sel_Pkt=NULL;

5

Cur_Pkt=Compare_Pkts(packet New_Pkt, packet Old_Pkt};

6

If(Cur_Pkt!=NULL && Cur_Pkt!=Sel_Pkt){

7

Process_RREP(Cur_Pkt);

8

Sel_Pkt=Cur_Pkt;

9

}

10

If(Cur_pkt!=NULL && Cur_pkt =New_Pkt)

11

5. Proposed Solution

12

Though there are many solutions proposed
by various authors to deal with black hole attack,
some of them are reviewed in this literature and
found to exhibit the effect on performance in terms
of increase in delay and overhead,

Old_Pkt= Cur_pkt;
Cur_Pkt=NULL;

13

}//End of while

14

}//End of Pre Process RREP()

Fig.-1 Proposed Algorithm: at source node
1

In this literature considering the limitations
(battery power, storage and processing power ) of
nomadic computing paradigm, we devise an
algorithm that prevents from black hole attack at the
cost of only marginal processing overhead. The
proposed algorithm is simple and does not affect
workings of either intermediate or destination node.
It does not even modify the working of normal
AODV
but
calls
a
preprocess
called
Pre_Process_RREP. The Process continues to
accepts RREP packets and calls a process called
Compare_Pkts(packet p1, packet p2) which actually
compares the destination sequence number of two
packets and selects the packet with higher
destination sequence number if the difference
between two numbers are not significantly high.
Packet containing exceptionally high destination
sequence number is suspected to be a malicious
node and an ALERT message containing the node
identification is generated which is broadcasted to
neighbor nodes so that any message receive from
such malicious node is discarded. A list of such
malicious nodes can be maintained by the nodes
participating in communication which can be used

Compare_Pkts(packet p1, packet p2){

2

Packet Selected_Pkt=NULL;

3

if(p1!=NULL && p1.dest_seq_no is exceptionally high){

4

generate ALERT message;

5

p1=NULL

6

}

7

if(p2!=NULL && p2.dest_seq_no is exceptionally high){

8

generate ALERT message;

9

p2=NULL

10

}

11

If(p1!=NULL && p2!=NULL)

12

Selected_Pkt=Packet

containing

higher

dest_seq_no.
13

else

14

If(p1!=NULL)

15

Selected_Pkt=p1;

16

else

17
18

Selected_Pkt=p2;
returm Selected_Pkt;

Fig.-2 Proposed Algorithm calls Compare_Pkts.
6. Conclusion
Black hole attack is one of the major security
challenges for MANETs. It is one of the active DoS
in which a malicious node impersonates a
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destination node by sending a forged RREP to the
source node. Although there exists many variants of
black hole attack, in this paper we just studied the
black hole attack by the existence of single
malicious node in the network and its solution
proposed by various authors. Review of the
proposed solutions suggests that the performance of
the routing protocol is affected in terms of
additional overheads, end-to-end delay and packet
delivery ratio. In our future work, we would carry
our research in optimizing the performance of a
network having black hole attack.
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